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Congress enacted the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”)1 in 1996 as part
of the Gingrich Revolution. Among its provisions, the CRA creates an expedited
path for Congress to repeal agency rules. This path, which ends in a “joint
resolution of disapproval,” does not produce a congressional statement of the
reasons for disapproval, or direction on how an agency should proceed following
disapproval. This lack of direction is a problem if an agency remains under a
statutory obligation to issue a rule covering matters addressed in the disapproved
rule.
The CRA also prohibits an agency from reissuing a new rule that is
“substantially the same” as a disapproved rule unless specifically authorized to do
so by Congress—but the CRA fails to define “substantially the same.” The lack of
definition sharpens the problem for agencies that not only remain subject to an
obligation to issue rules, but where a large portion of the content of those rules is
prescribed by statute. Such agencies cannot ignore their mandate to promulgate
rules, or the substantive provisions required to be included in those rules, yet they
have no way to know how, or how much, a new rule must depart from the
disapproved rule.
Further complicating matters, resolutions of disapproval are, as a practical
matter, available only when one political party controls both houses of Congress
and the White House, and following shifts in power between political parties.
Single party control over government rarely lasts long, yet the fallout from a joint
resolution of disapproval can linger for years, salting the earth for future
rulemaking efforts. Indeed, twenty rules have fallen victim to the CRA with only
two of those rules being replaced. The chilling effect on agency action may
therefore be more significant than disapproval itself.
We argue here that the CRA does more harm than good and should be
repealed. Absent repeal, we argue that Congress should provide specific direction
for future agency action as part of any joint resolution of disapproval, and for a
narrow definition of “substantially the same” that is confined to those portions of
a rule that are committed to agency discretion. We use the Bureau of Land
* Professor of Law (Research) & Wallace Stegner Center Fellow, University of Utah, S.J.
Quinney College of Law.
** J.D. Candidate, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law.
This article was made possible by the ESRR Wallace Stegner Endowment and the
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5 U.S.C. §§ 801–900.
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Management’s (“BLM”) planning rule as an example of how an agency that must
enact a broad regulatory program could proceed following a joint resolution of
disapproval, and to demonstrate that changes that make a replacement rule more
defensible could frustrate the will of the disapproving Congress.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT

The CRA grew out of Newt Gingrich and Dick Armey’s “Contract with
America,” which was introduced to the public prior to the 1994 congressional
midterm elections. Two years after the midterms, Congress passed the CRA and
President Clinton signed it into law as part of the 1996 Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act.2 The CRA was a reaction to the expanding
administrative state, curtailing what some saw as an abdication of Congress’
legislative functions and executive oversight responsibilities.
The CRA contains multiple provisions aimed at increasing congressional
oversight of administrative agency action. One provision requires agencies to
submit all final rules to Congress and the Government Accountability Office
before those rules go into effect.3 By requiring rule submission, the CRA keeps
Congress apprised of administrative actions and allows Congress to supervise
agency rulemaking more effectively.
In addition to its review function, the CRA also creates an expedited path
to eliminate rules through a joint resolution of disapproval, stripping the rule of
legal force and effect. 4 If a resolution is introduced within the sixty session or
legislative days following receipt of a rule, expedited parliamentary procedures
are available in considering the resolution. 5 For rules that were finalized during
the final sixty session days of the Senate or final sixty days of the House of
Representatives, the sixty day review window reopens “in the succeeding session
of Congress,”6 and runs from the fifteenth day session or legislative day after the
succeeding Congress first convenes. 7
During that review period the CRA provides the Senate a faster and easier
2

Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (Mar.
29, 1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 601).
3

5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).

4

5 U.S.C. § 802.

5

5 U.S.C. § 802(a).

6

5 U.S.C. § 801(d)(1).

7

5 U.S.C. § 801(d)(2).
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path through committee.8 Another provision limits floor debate on a resolution to
ten hours split evenly between those arguing for and against disapproval, avoiding
potential filibusters.9 Additionally, the joint resolution is not subject to
amendments.10 If Congress does not act on the resolution within sixty session days
of receiving a rule from an agency, the CRA’s “fast track” procedures are
unavailable and normal parliamentary procedures are required to rescind a rule. 11
The CRA does not contain comparable procedures for fast tracking a joint
resolution of disapproval in the House. But each time the House has considered a
CRA disapproval resolution, it has done so under special rules prohibiting floor
amendments.12
If Congress does pass a joint resolution of disapproval and the President
signs it into law, the CRA dictates that a disapproved rule “may not be reissued in
substantially the same form, and a new rule that is substantially the same as such a
rule may not be issued, unless the new rule is specifically authorized by a law
enacted after the joint resolution disapproving the original rule.”13 Congress did
not define “substantially the same” in the CRA, and legislative history sheds little
light on the term’s intended meaning. Moreover, resolutions of disapproval do not
provide substantive guidance in determining what constitutes “substantially the
same.” Resolutions of disapproval contain only the following boilerplate language
following the resolving clause: “‘That Congress disapproves the rule submitted by
the __ relating to __, and such rule shall have no force or effect.’ (The blank
8

5 U.S.C. § 802(c).

9

5 U.S.C. § 802(d)(2).

10

5 U.S.C. §§ 802(d)(1) and (2).

11

5 U.S.C. § 802(e).

12

MAEVE P. CAREY & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE CONGRESSIONAL
REVIEW ACT (CRA): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 14 (2020 UPDATE). See also, S.J. Res.
13, S.J. Res. 14, and S.J. Res. 15 (117th Cong. 2021) (the three joint resolutions of
disapproval enacted after publication of the Carey and Davis report).
5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2). Section 801(b)(2) uses the phrases “substantially the same form” and
“substantially the same.” “Substantially the same form” relates to an attempt at re-issuing the
same rule that was disapproved under the CRA, while the subsequent “substantially the same”
relates to an entirely new attempt at rulemaking. The difference between the two phrases
seems to be based on whether the agency is starting subsequent rulemaking from a clean slate
as opposed to simply adjusting portions of the disapproved rule. Thus, for our purposes,
“substantially the same form” and “substantially the same” do not hold significantly different
meanings. As such, we will only use the phrase “substantially the same” unless quoting
directly from a source using the phrase “substantially the same form.”
13
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spaces being appropriately filled in).”14
Finally, the CRA states that “[n]o determination, finding, action, or
omission under [the CRA] shall be subject to judicial review.” 15 At first blush
seems to provide agencies issuing a replacement regulation some cover from
challenge, but the 10th Circuit opined recently that “a court with proper
jurisdiction may review the resolution of disapproval and the law that authorized
the disapproved rule to determine whether the issuing agency has the legal
authority to issue a substantially different rule.” 16 The 10th Circuit then noted that
because the replacement rule would be issued pursuant to a law other than the
CRA, review would remain available under that other statute, independent of the
CRA’s prohibition on judicial review.17
II.

USE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT

Prior to 2017, the CRA was used only once to disapprove an agency
In 2001, Congress and President George W. Bush used the CRA to
disapprove of an Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) rule
pertaining to ergonomics and musculoskeletal workplace injuries (“the
Ergonomics Rule”).19 Following disapproval of the Ergonomics Rule, the CRA
was not employed again until 2017, when it was used sixteen times by the
Republican-controlled Congress and President Trump to disapprove Obama-era
rules.20 Four years later, the CRA was used three times by the Democratrule.18

14

5 U.S.C. § 802(a).

15

5 U.S.C. § 805.

Kansas Natural Resource Coalition v. Dep’t of Interior, 971 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir.
2020) (internal quotation and citations omitted).
16

17

Id. at 1236-37 (10th Cir. 2020). See also, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bernhardt, 946
F.3d 553, 561 (9th Cir., 2019) (“the Jurisdiction-Stripping Provision does not include any
explicit language barring judicial review of constitutional claims. Therefore, we presume that
Congress did not intend to bar such review.”); Tugaw Ranches, LLC v. Dep’t of Interior, 362
F.Supp.3d 879, 888 (D. Idaho 2019) (“It appears clear that those who promulgated [the CRA]
understood that actions taken by certain actors would not be reviewable, but that this nonreviewability did not extend to all CRA actors and that specifically agency action would be
reviewable.”).
18

CAREY & DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 12 at 25.

Dep’t of Labor, OSHA, Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,262 (Nov. 14, 2000); Pub.
L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7 (Mar. 20, 2001) (disapproving the Ergonomics Rule).
19

20

For a list of all disapproved regulations, see CAREY & DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra
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controlled Congress and President Biden. 21
Resolutions of disapproval are an effective tool only when two factors
converge: single-party control over both houses of Congress and the White
House; and following a change in political party control of government. The CRA
becomes useful only under these narrow circumstances because split political
control of Congress would likely prevent enactment of a joint resolution of
disapproval, and because a President is unlikely to sign a resolution disapproving
of a rule reflecting similar policy priorities. Resolutions of disapproval therefore
tend to solidify partisan positions.
Single party control over both houses of Congress and the presidency,
however, is rarely lasting. In the thirteen congressional terms since the CRA’s
enactment in 1996, a single political party has only once controlled government
for two consecutive congressional terms. 22
Evidencing their partisan nature, 23 joint resolutions of disapproval impose
a blanket “no.” While Congress could provide direction, all twenty joint
resolutions of disapproval enacted to date are silent regarding intent or future
direction. Agencies know only that a replacement rule must be substantially
different from the prior rule, but they know neither how much of a change is
required, or what changes Congress intended when it passed the joint resolution.
This places agencies in a difficult spot, as some agencies remain statutorily
obligated to promulgate rules. 24
note 12 at 25–26.
21

See Pub. L. No. 117-22 (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s rule regarding
Conciliation Procedures), Pub. L. No. 117-23 (Environmental Protection Agency’s rule
regarding Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and
Modified Sources Review), and Pub. L. No. 117-24 (Comptroller of Currency’s rule
regarding National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders).
22

The Republican party held a majority in both the House and the Senate as well as the White
House during the 108th (2003-2005) and 109th Congress (2005-2007).
23

All twenty joint resolutions of disapproval enacted to date passed both houses of Congress
almost entirely on party line votes. Notably, even the joint resolution of disapproval with the
greatest level of bipartisan support, the very first resolution undoing the OSHA Ergonomics
Rule, was passed along party lines. See S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong. (2001) (garnering “Yea”
votes from 206 Republicans and 16 Democrats in the House and 51 Republicans and 5
Democrats in the Senate, respectively).
24

See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission, Disclosure of Payments by Resource
Extraction Issuers, 85 Fed. Reg. 2522, 2526 (Jan. 15, 2020) (“Although the joint resolution
vacated the 2016 Rules, the statutory mandate under Section 13(q) of the Exchange Act
remains in effect. As a result, the Commission is statutorily obligated to issue a new rule.”);
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Knowing that they have already displeased Congress once and fearing that
further missteps could impact agency funding or authority, agencies may be
reluctant to expend their limited resources revising rules struck down under the
CRA. Indeed, only twice has an agency issued a new rule addressing the
substantive issues covered in a repealed rule.25
If agencies do proceed, they will likely seek to demonstrate that they have
taken congressional displeasure into account, but doing so requires them to guess
at congressional intent. Changes in administration priorities following enactment
of a joint resolution of disapproval, and the prospect that priorities may change
again with the next election, can further complicate or chill agency action.
With twenty rules having fallen victim to the CRA and only two of those
rules undergoing subsequent rulemaking, resolutions of disapproval can continue
to shape agency action for years to come, entrenching partisan sentiments to the
likely detriment of bipartisan action. In that sense, resolutions of disapproval
enshrine the “dead hand of the past,”26 and are harmful to the effective
functioning of government. This chilling effect on agency action, we fear, may be
more significant than disapproval itself, especially where agency responsibilities
touch on matters like public health.
We turn now to the BLM Planning Rule, to give shape to what has thus far
been a largely abstract discussion. In proposing a path forward, we explore some
of the legal challenges facing agencies, and identify significant weaknesses with
the CRA that justify its repeal.

Dep’t of Labor, Federal-State Unemployment Compensation Program; Establishing
Appropriate Occupations for Drug Testing of Unemployment Compensation Applicants
Under the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, 84 Fed. Reg. 53,037,
53,038 (Oct. 4, 2019) (“The rule implements the statutory requirement that the Secretary issue
regulations determining how to identify “an occupation that regularly conducts drug
testing.”).
25

See SEC, Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 86 Fed. Reg. 4662 (Jan.
15, 2021); Dep’t of Labor, Federal-State Unemployment Compensation Program;
Establishing Appropriate Occupations for Drug Testing of Unemployment Compensation
Applicants Under the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, 84 Fed. Reg.
53,037 (Oct. 4, 2019).
26

See United States v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 906 (5th Cir. 1966), on
reh’g, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967) (Cox, J., dissenting) (“in moving water there is life, in
still waters there is stagnation and death.”).
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III.

BACKGROUND ON THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT’S
PLANNING RULES

Approximately twenty-eight percent of the United States, or 653 million
acres of land surface (over 1 million square-miles) is owned by the federal
government.27 Of this, the BLM manages 244 million acres of land surface, 28
more than any other federal agency. The BLM also manages the federal
government’s 710 million acre onshore mineral estate when the surface estate is
controlled by a non-federal entity or by another federal agency. 29 Management of
this landscape is prescribed by multiple federal laws, the two primary ones being
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”), and the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”).
A.

The Bureau of Land Management’s Statutory Mandate

Congress, when it enacted FLPMA, directed the BLM to inventory “all
public lands and their resource and other values (including, but not limited to,
outdoor recreation and scenic values), giving priority to areas of critical
environmental concern. This inventory shall be kept current so as to reflect
changes in conditions and to identify new and emerging resource and other
values.”30 Based on this inventory, the Secretary of the Interior must develop,
maintain, and periodically update plans providing long-term direction for land use
management.31 In developing and revising Resource Management Plans
(“RMPs”), the Secretary of the Interior must:
(1) use and observe the principles of multiple use and sustained
yield set forth in this and other applicable law;
27

Dept. of the Interior, Public Land Statistics 2019 7, Table 1-3, Mineral and Surface Acres
Administered by the Bureau of Land Management, Fiscal Year 2019 (2020).
28

Id.

29

George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, 4 Pub. Nat. Resources L. § 39.22 (2d
ed. 2017); Public Land Statistics 2019, supra note 26 at 7, Table 1-3.
30

43 U.S.C. § 1711(a).

43 U.S.C. § 1712(a). “Public involvement” means “the opportunity for participation by
affected citizens in rule making, decision making, and planning with respect to the public
lands, including public meetings or hearings held at locations near the affected lands, or
advisory mechanisms, or such other procedures as may be necessary to provide public
comment in a particular instance.” 43 U.S.C. § 1702(d).
31
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(2) use a systematic interdisciplinary approach to achieve
integrated consideration of physical, biological, economic, and
other sciences;
(3) give priority to the designation and protection of areas of
critical environmental concern;
(4) rely, to the extent it is available, on the inventory of the public
lands, their resources, and other values;
(5) consider present and potential uses of the public lands;
(6) consider the relative scarcity of the values involved and the
availability of alternative means (including recycling) and sites
for realization of those values;
(7) weigh long-term benefits to the public against short-term
benefits;
(8) provide for compliance with applicable pollution control laws,
including State and Federal air, water, noise, or other pollution
standards or implementation plans; and
(9) to the extent consistent with the laws governing the
administration of the public lands, coordinate the land use
inventory, planning, and management activities of or for such
lands with the land use planning and management programs of
other Federal departments and agencies and of the States and
local governments within which the lands are located. . . .32
The Secretary must also “take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary
or undue degradation of the lands.”33 To implement these requirements, the
Secretary “shall” issue rules establishing “procedures, including public hearings
where appropriate, to give Federal, State, and local governments and the public,
adequate notice and opportunity to comment upon and participate in the
formulation of plans and programs relating to the management of the public
lands.”34
To the extent consistent with other laws, the Secretary of the Interior must
coordinate land use planning and management with similar efforts that are being
undertaken by other federal agencies, tribes, and state and local governments. 35
32

43 U.S.C. § 1712(c).

33

43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).

34

43 U.S.C. § 1712(f).

35

43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9).
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This includes considering carefully the policies of approved state and tribal land
resource management programs, and maximizing consistency across plans to the
maximum extent possible.36
Supplementing FLPMA’s substantive mandate, NEPA imposes procedural
requirements that apply to RMP development or revision.37 Under NEPA,
developing or revising an RMP is a “major Federal action[] significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment,”38 and such actions require the BLM to
prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”).39 The BLM combines its
planning and NEPA analysis such that the analysis of management alternatives
and environmental impact review are combined into a single document. 40
Procedurally, this means that the BLM begins the planning and
environmental review process with a “scoping” period, where the agency seeks
public input in identifying the issues to be addressed and the range of alternative
management scenarios meriting consideration.41 Following scoping, the BLM
prepares a combined draft RMP and EIS. The draft is made available for public
comment for at least 90 days,42 comments are reviewed by the BLM, and
comments are addressed through revisions to the draft or in a separate response to
comments.43 The BLM then issues a proposed RMP and final EIS reflecting these
changes and any other new information or analysis. 44 That decision is subject to a
30-day protest period that is open to any member of the public who participated in
the planning process and who has an interest that may be adversely affected by
the approval.45 The decision is also subject to review, by the governor of the state
36

Id.

37

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47. The White House Council on Environmental Quality promulgates
NEPA’s implementing regulations, which are binding on the BLM. See Exec. Order No.
11991 (1977) (modifying Exec. Order No. 11514 (1970)).
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); see also 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-6 (declaring that RMP approval “is
considered a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment” and therefore necessitates EIS preparation).
38

39

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).

40

43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-6.

41

40 C.F.R. § 1501.9(a).

42

43 C.F.R. § 1610.2(e).

43

40 C.F.R. § 1503.4.

44

43 C.F.R. § 1610.4-8.

45

43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-2(a).
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where the plan is being developed, for consistency with state and local plans.46 If
an inconsistency is identified by a governor, then the BLM can either revise the
RMP to address the governor’s recommendations, or reject the proposed revisions
and provide a written explanation for the rejection of the governor’s
recommendations.47 Finally, the U.S. Department of the Interior issues a record of
decision, which is then subject to judicial review. 48
Other laws, including but not limited to the Endangered Species Act, the
Mineral Leasing Act, and the National Historic Preservation Act provide
additional substantive and procedural sideboards on the scope of the BLM’s
management discretion. The BLM’s management discretion is thus heavily
prescribed by law.
B.

The Bureau of Land Management’s Planning Rules

The BLM first issued land use planning rules in 1979,49 making minor
revisions to these rules in 1983,50 and again in 2005.51 In 2011, the BLM began a
comprehensive review of its planning rules. This effort, known as Planning 2.0,
focused on three main goals: First, addressing “the need for land use plans that
support effective management when faced with environmental uncertainty,
incomplete information, or changing conditions.”52 Second, providing meaningful
opportunities for other federal agencies, state and local governments, Indian
tribes, and the public to be involved in RMP development.53 Third, improving the
BLM’s ability to plan for and manage resources extending beyond traditional

46

43 C.F.R. § 1610.3-2(e).

47

Id.

48

43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-2(b).

49

See Public Lands and Resources; Planning, Programming, and Budgeting, 44 Fed. Reg.
46,386 (Aug. 7, 1979) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 1600).
50

Planning, Programming, Budgeting; Amendments to the Planning Regulations; Elimination
of Unneeded Provisions, 48 Fed. Reg. 20,364, 20,364 (May 5, 1983) (to be codified at 43
C.F.R. pt. 1600).
51

Land Use Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. 14,561 (Mar. 23, 2005) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R.
pt. 1600).
52

Resource Management Planning, 81 Fed. Reg. 9674, 9679 (proposed Feb. 25, 2016) (to be
codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 1600).
53

Id.
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management boundaries. 54 The final Planning 2.0 rule was issued on December
12, 2016.55
Some Western Governors’ Association (“WGA”) members feared that
their ability to influence federal land management decisions would decrease under
Planning 2.0. The first of their three main complaints was that the rule
undermined requirements to consider state and local planning documents. 56
FLPMA requires consistency between BLM plans and state and local plans “to
the maximum extent [the Secretary] finds consistent with Federal law and the
purposes of this Act.”57 While Planning 2.0 did not (and could not) reduce this
requirement, Planning 2.0 was somewhat narrower than the prior rule in applying
only to “officially approved and adopted plans” while the prior rule required
consideration of “officially approved and adopted resource related policies and
programs.”58
Second, Planning 2.0 gave the BLM more latitude in defining the planning
area to extend beyond field office boundaries in response to landscape-scale
concerns.59 Some within the WGA expressed concern that the “BLM’s emphasis
on landscape-scale planning may lead to a resulting emphasis on national
objectives over state and local objectives.” 60 “Given BLM’s increased use of
landscape-scale planning, Western Governors expect multiple RMPs to cross state
boundaries. Western states are concerned that this could shift key responsibilities
away from BLM state directors and obscure state and local priorities in favor of
national priorities.”61 Increasing the size of the planning area would have also, in
the eyes of some WGA members, increased the number of stakeholders providing
54

Id. at 9679–80.

55

Resource Management Planning, 81 Fed. Reg. 89,580 (Dec. 12, 2016) (to be codified at 43
C.F.R. pt. 1600) (hereinafter Planning 2.0).
56

Letter from Montana Governor Steve Bullock and South Dakota Governor Dennis
Daugaard, Chair and Vice-Chair of the Western Governors’ Ass’n, to Senate Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell, Senate Minority Leader Charles Schumer, Speaker of the House Paul
Ryan, and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, at 4-5 (Feb. 10, 2017) (WGA Letter).
57

43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9).

58

Planning 2.0, to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3-3(a) (emphasis added). Cf., § 1610.32(b) (emphasis added).
59

Compare, 43 C.F.R. § 1610.1(b), and Planning 2.0, to be codified at 43 C.F.R. §
1610.4(a)(1).
60

WGA Letter at 3.

61

Id.
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input on BLM decisions, thereby diminishing the voice of any one state or local
government entity.62
Third, Planning 2.0 reduced the comment period for most draft RMP
amendments from 90- to 60-days.63 That change applied to all stakeholders, but
Planning 2.0’s critics contended that reducing the time allowed to review and
comment diminished state and local governments’ voice in the planning process.
Displeased over Planning 2.0, a coalition of counties joined with the Doña Ana
Soil and Water Conservation District to challenge Planning 2.0. 64
C.

The Death of Planning 2.0

Less than two months after Planning 2.0’s enactment, the House of
Representatives, in accordance with the CRA, passed a resolution disapproving of
the rule.65 That resolution was approved by the Senate on March 7, 2017 and
signed into law by President Trump on March 27, 2017.66 The resolution, in its
entirety, states that:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress
disapproves the rule submitted by the Bureau of Land Management
of the Department of the Interior relating to “Resource
Management Planning” (published at 81 Fed. Reg. 89580
(December 12, 2016)), and such rule shall have no force or effect. 67
Congress provided no explanation of Planning 2.0’s failings in the joint
62

Notably, landscape-scale planning occurred prior to Planning 2.0. See, e.g., Notice of
Availability of the ROD and Approved RMP Amendments for the Great Basin Region
Greater Sage-Grouse Sub-Regions of Idaho and Southwestern Montana, Nevada and
Northeastern California, Oregon, and Utah, 80 Fed. Reg. 57,633 (Sept. 24, 2015).
63

Compare 43 C.F.R. § 1610.2(e), and Planning 2.0, to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 1610.22(b).
64

See Petition for Review of Final Agency Action at 2–4, Kane Cnty. v. United States,
No. 2:16-cv-01245 (D. Utah Dec. 12, 2016). This suit was dismissed following enactment of
the resolution of disapproval that repealed Planning 2.0. See Rule 41(a) Notice of Dismissal,
Kane Cnty. v. United States, No. 2:16-cv-01245 (D. Utah Mar. 30, 2017).
65

H.R.J. Res. 44, 115th Cong. (2017).

66

Pub. L. No. 115-12, 131 Stat. 76 (2017).

67

Id.
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resolution of disapproval, though the House debate on the resolution is somewhat
enlightening. Representatives favoring disapproval reiterated the same complaints
raised by the WGA:68 (1) narrowing the consistency requirements to “officially
approved and adopted resource related policies and programs,” (2) emphasizing
landscape-scale planning elevated national objectives over state and local
concerns, and (3) reducing the time allowed to review and comment diminished
state and local governments’ voice in the planning process.69
D.

The Need for a New Planning Rule

Following the joint resolution of disapproval and effective reinstatement
of the prior planning rule, the BLM operates under a rule that has received only
scant revisions since its original issuance forty-two years ago. Industry and
environmentalists alike agree that the BLM’s planning rule is overdue for an
update. The BLM remains statutorily obligated to promulgate planning rules, and
both the substantive and procedural content of these rules is heavily dictated by
FLPMA and NEPA. The BLM cannot stray from these obligations, yet the joint
resolution of disapproval and prohibition against issuing a substantially similar
rule hangs over the BLM like the Sword of Damocles.
Before exploring specific ways in which the BLM could revise Planning
2.0 without violating the CRA’s “substantially the same” prohibition, we will first
explore the legal quagmire created by this undefined phrase.
IV.

THE “SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME” QUAGMIRE

By failing to define “substantially the same,” Congress created a
regulatory environment fraught with uncertainty and instability. Agencies that are
subject to joint resolutions of disapproval may avoid subsequent rulemaking for
fear of violating the CRA, leaving important administrative problems
unaddressed. Agencies that are statutorily obligated to promulgate rules but are
68

Cong. Rec. H1032-41 (Feb. 7, 2017).

In the words of Representative Liz Cheney, the resolution’s lead sponsor, Planning 2.0
“takes authority away from people in local communities. . . . It takes authority away from our
elected representatives at a local level, and it puts Washington bureaucrats in charge of
decisions that influence and impact our lives.” Id. at H1032. “Planning 2.0 directs the BLM to
perform large, landscape-scale planning efforts that stretch across county lines and State lines.
This new regulation allows radical, special interest groups from other States to have the same
influence as county and local officials in the planning process.” Id. at H1036 (statement of
Rep. Gossar).
69
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constrained by a joint resolution of disapproval must choose between two perils:
risk violating the substantive statute by not regulating fully, or risk violating the
CRA by issuing a rule that is “substantially the same” as the disapproved rule.
To date, the most extensive discussion of the “substantially the same”
comes from a post-enactment statement by Senators Don Nickels, Harry Reid,
and Ted Stevens. According to these Senators, “[i]t will be the agency’s
responsibility in the first instance when promulgating the rule to determine the
range of discretion afforded under the original law and whether the law authorizes
the agency to issue a substantially different rule.”70 The three suggest that
agencies having broad, statutorily granted discretion to regulate may continue to
do so; that a joint resolution of disapproval may effectively prohibit agencies from
issuing new rules if agency discretion is “narrowly circumscribed” by other laws;
and that agencies should look to the debate on any joint resolution to determine
congressional intent.71
Setting aside the practical challenges involved in divining congressional
intent from an abridged floor debate, the Senators’ advice on whether and how an
agency should proceed is hard to square with normal rules of statutory
construction. Courts are reluctant to rely on post-enactment statements by
individual lawmakers to divine congressional intent, and the same cautions should
apply to agency staff. “Post-enactment legislative history (a contradiction in
terms) is not a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation. . . . [P]ost-enactment
legislative history by definition could have had no effect on the congressional
vote.”72 As such, an agency’s path forward remains, at best, unclear. Congress
should say what it wants rather than make agencies search for hidden meanings.
We therefore turn next to secondary sources for interpretive guidance.
A.

Interpretive Options for “Substantially the Same”

Determining whether a rule is “substantially the same” as a disapproved
rule requires a context specific analysis. According to the Congressional Research
Service, “sameness could be determined by scope, penalty level, textual
similarity, or administrative policy, among other factors,”73 all of which require
70

Joint Explanatory Statement of House and Senate Sponsors, 142 CONG. REC. S.3683 (daily
ed. Apr. 18, 1996).
71

Id.

72

Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 242 (2011) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
73

MAEVE P. CAREY, ALISSA M. DOLAN & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE
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attention to the details of any given rule. We focus here on two prominent
interpretive arguments: First, addressing the reasons for disapproval given by
Congress when promulgating a new rule; and second, assessing “substantially the
same” based on the rulemaking discretion left to the agency by an underlying
statute. We then discuss whether resolutions amend underlying substantive
statutes.
1.

Address the Reasons for Disapproval

By focusing on congressional concerns, agencies maximize opportunities
to affect changes that result in the kinds of substantial differences that Congress
intended.74 Agencies also depend on Congress for their legal authority to regulate,
and for adequate and stable budgets. Agencies therefore pay close attention to
direction contained in duly enacted laws and are unlikely to disregard the reasons
Congress disapproved of a rule in crafting substantially different replacement
rules.75
Resolutions of disapproval, however, do not identify the reasons for
congressional disfavor. All twenty resolutions of disapproval contain identical
language, and none include either a statement of the problems with the
disapproved rule, or direction for redressing those concerns. Absent such direct
statements, the Congressional Record of the House floor debate on a resolution
provides the most authoritative source of information. Indeed, according to the
explanatory statement provided by the CRA’s co-sponsors, “The authors intend
the debate on any resolution of disapproval to focus on the law that authorized the
rule and make the congressional intent clear regarding the agency’s options or
lack thereof after enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval.”76 But statements
from individual Representatives provide a poor picture of congressional intent

CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 17 (2016).
74

Congress may have also intended agencies to revise procedural aspects of the disapproved
rule. “In other words, the original rule deserved a veto because of how it was issued, not just
because of what was issued, and the agency needs to change its attitude, not just its output.”
Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 73 at 736. So, in going back to the drawing board, agencies can
address the methods used in promulgating a rule as well as the substance of the rule itself.
Adam M. Finkel & Jason W. Sullivan, A Cost-Benefit Interpretation of the “Substantially
Similar” Hurdle in the Congressional Review Act: Can OSHA Ever Utter the E-Word
(Ergonomics) Again?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 707, 736 (2011).
75

76

Joint Explanatory Statement of House and Senate Sponsors, 142 CONG. REC. S.3683 (daily
ed. Apr. 18, 1996).
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under normal circumstances,77 and debate under the CRA is heavily constrained,
making a clouded picture even worse. Congress should make its intentions clear
and not expect agencies to read tea leaves.
Additionally, the intent of the Congress that enacted the joint resolution of
disapproval may have little in common with the priorities of the current Congress
or President. This places agencies in the unenviable position of having to choose
between fidelity to ambiguous and non-binding direction, and rulemaking based
on an assessment of current objectives that may conflict with a joint resolution of
disapproval. The legal answer is that the CRA requires only that a replacement
rule differ substantially from its predecessor, not that it differ in ways that
Congress may have intended but not reduced to law. As the late Justice Antonin
Scalia famously said, “We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of
legislators,”78 and the “[t]he text is the law, and it is the text that must be
observed.”79 An agency may therefore differentiate a rule by acting in ways that
Congress did not intend.
Congress, for example, disapproved of the Office of Surface Mining,
Reclamation, and Enforcement’s 2016 Stream Protection Rule 80 because that rule
was perceived as too burdensome on the coal mining industry.81 While the
Republican majority in the 115th Congress clearly preferred a rule that would be
less onerous, Congress did not reduce that goal to a legal requirement. A
replacement rule could therefore distinguish itself from its predecessor by being
more protective of the streams into which coal waste is discharged, thereby
potentially making compliance more burdensome on the coal mining industry.
While we tend to believe that increased stream protections would be good policy
77

SW Gen., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 796 F.3d 67, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 929 (2017),
citing Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969) (“Floor debates reflect at best the
understanding of individual Congressmen.”); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311, 99
S.Ct. 1705, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979) (“The remarks of a single legislator, even the sponsor, are
not controlling in analyzing legislative history.”).
78

Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).

79

ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 22 (1997). See also, In Re Sinclair, 870
F.2d 1340, 1341 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that when conflict exists between statute and its
legislative history, the statute prevails).
80

Fed. Reg. 93066 (Dec. 20, 2016) (final rule).

See e.g., CONG. REC. H.841 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2017) (comments of Rep. Johnson, “make no
mistake about it, the stream protection rule is not about protecting streams. It was designed
for one purpose—to regulate the coal mining industry out of business. It is the centerpiece of
the Obama administration’s war on coal.”).
81

17

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3906956

20210817 draft

** Pre-Publication Draft **
Forthcoming, 21 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y __ (Nov. 2021)
and make the new regulation substantially different and therefore more
defensible, that outcome conflicts with the intentions of the Congress that passed
the resolution. One can easily imagine a scenario where the political tables are
turned.
This legally correct approach also ignores political and pragmatic realities.
Agencies may decide to focus on other matters rather than wade into a political
quagmire. Of the twenty rules disapproved of by Congress, only two have been
reissued.82 The real effect of a joint resolution of disapproval therefore appears to
be a chilling of agency action. Assuming agencies do forge ahead, we believe that
they should focus on matters within their discretion.
2.

Assessment of Agency Discretion in Rulemaking

Professor Cary Coglianese proposed a compelling interpretive approach in
response to a 2020 SEC proposed rule. That proposed rule addressed a situation
where a resolution disapproves an agency rule, and the agency remains statutorily
obligated to promulgate a rule addressing the same substantive issues. Professor
Coglianese argues that “the approach that best respects both the statutory
prohibition in the CRA and statutory requirement in the substantive law is to look
to see whether the agency has exercised its discretion in substantially the same
manner.”83
To illustrate the argument, Professor Coglianese asks us to envision an
agency rule containing 100 words. A statute mandates that the agency include 70
specific words in the rule. This leaves the agency with discretion over 30 of the
100 words in the rule. If Congress disapproved the initial rule using the CRA, the
agency could only change 30 of those words without violating its statutory
mandate under the substantive statute. While 70-percent of a new rule would be
identical to the disapproved rule, the new rule should be upheld if the agency
made significant substantive changes to the remaining 30-percent. This is because
the agency acted in good faith to comply with both the CRA and the underlying
statutory mandate. Requiring changes to the statutorily mandated 70 words
82

See SEC, Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 86 Fed. Reg. 4662 (Jan.
15, 2021); Dep’t of Labor, Federal-State Unemployment Compensation Program;
Establishing Appropriate Occupations for Drug Testing of Unemployment Compensation
Applicants Under the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, 84 Fed. Reg.
53,037 (Oct. 4, 2019).
Cary Coglianese, Solving the Congressional Review Act’s Conundrum, U. PENN. L. SCH.,
SSRN, Pub. L. Rsch. Paper No. 20-15, 1 (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3567230.
83
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“would imply that the CRA has repealed the substantive statute that requires those
70 words,”84 which Professor Coglianese argues violates various canons of
statutory construction.85 Thus, the agency need only ensure that the discretionary
portions of any new rule differ substantially from the discretionary portions of the
disapproved rule. We agree with Professor Coglianese that the prohibition against
issuing a rule that is “substantially the same” as a previously disapproved rule is
best understood in light of agency discretion. But before exploring how this
approach could be applied to potential revisions of Planning 2.0, we will first
address whether the CRA does indeed amend the underlying statute.
B.
Effect of a Joint Resolution and the CRA on Underlying
Statutes
While Professor Coglianese and others argue persuasively that a joint
resolution of disapproval does not amend an underlying statute, a recent case
illustrates that a broad interpretation of “substantially the same” could have the
same substantive effect as amending an underlying statute.
In 2019, the Center for Biological Diversity (“CBD”) sought to compel the
Department of the Interior (“DOI”) to re-issue regulations that had been
disapproved under the CRA. CBD argued that the CRA and the joint resolution
violated separation of powers principles because they interfered with the
Executive Branch’s duty under the Take Care clause of the Constitution.
Specifically, CBD noted that Congress had statutorily directed the executive
branch, through the DOI, to manage federal wildlife refuges. CBD then argued
that the CRA joint resolution of disapproval prevented the DOI from
implementing its constitutional duty to faithfully execute these laws.86 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding that “When Congress
enacts legislation that directs an agency to issue a particular rule, ‘Congress has
amended the law.’ ”87
This holding suggests disapproval could amend substantive provisions of
the law under which the agency promulgated the rule. This interpretation might
84

Id. at 6.

85

Id. at 5 (discussing, in the context of the CRA and the Dodd-Frank Act, that repeals of
statutes should be expressly stated by Congress, the specific controls over the general, and
that later statutes prevail over earlier statutes).
See U.S. Const., art II,§ 3 (the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”).
86

87

946 F.3d 553, 562 (9th Cir. 2019).
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make sense in circumstances where an agency issued a narrow rule, under a
statutory provision with minimal agency discretion, that Congress then rejected
through the CRA. For example, imagine that the 115th Congress passed a statute
prohibiting the sale of menthol cigarettes in National Parks on Sundays and
directed the DOI to issue implementing regulations. Disregarding the obvious
problems with such a law, imagine that the DOI issued the regulations at the end
of the Trump administration, and that the next Congress issued a joint resolution
of disapproval. Because the underlying statute leaves little room for agency
discretion, by disapproving of the regulations, Congress effectively amended the
underlying statute. In fact, a similar situation occurred in Alliance for the Rockies
v. Salazar, which the Bernhardt court relied heavily upon in its reasoning.
Alliance for the Wild Rockies involved the gray wolf, which is protected
under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). A 2009 DOI rule eliminated the
ESA’s protections for a distinct population segment of the gray wolf. Prior
litigation struck down the 2009 rule for violating the ESA. Congress subsequently
passed a law requiring the DOI to re-issue the 2009 Delisting Rule “without
regard to any other provision of statute or regulation that applies to issuance of
such rule.” 88 In Alliance for the Wild Rockies, the court held that Congress, in
directing the DOI to disregard applicable provisions of the ESA, substantively
amended the ESA with respect to that one specific rule for a distinct population
segment of a single species.89
Interpreting the joint resolution of disapproval to repeal the underlying law
comports with the wishes of at least some of the CRA’s sponsors who argued that
“if an agency is mandated to promulgate a particular rule and its discretion in
issuing the rule is narrowly circumscribed, the enactment of a resolution of
disapproval for that rule may work to prohibit the reissuance of any rule.” 90 This
result also comports with the principle that when two statutes are in irreconcilable
conflict, the older of the statutes normally yields to the more recently enacted
statute.91 A joint resolution of disapproval, always enacted later in time than the
88

Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar, 672 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2012).

89

Id. at 1174.

90

Joint Explanatory Statement of House and Senate Sponsors, 142 CONG. REC. S.3683, 3686
(daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996).
See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 285 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“If two inconsistent
acts be passed at different times, the last. . . is to be obeyed; and if obedience cannot be
observed without derogating from the first, it is the first which must give way.”) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1646
(2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Enacted later in time, the NLRA should qualify as an
91
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underlying statutes, would thus control if it is impossible to reconcile the
resolution with the underlying statute.
However, the narrow statutory provision at issue in Alliance for the
Rockies does not justify broader and ill-defined repeals. The holding in Alliance
for the Wild Rockies also turned on the affirmative statement by Congress
disregarding other statutory provisions (“without regard to any other provision of
statute.”).92 Where a joint resolution of disapproval contains only boilerplate
language rather than affirmative direction, broad repeals should not be implied.93
Other canons of statutory construction also counsel against such implied
amendments. First, implied statutory repeals are strongly disfavored. 94 It is well
settled that unless the two statutes or statutory provisions are entirely
irreconcilable, a court should give effect to both. 95 By way of example, in Morton
v. Mancari,96 federal employees argued that the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934’s preference for hiring Native Americans as employees in the Bureau of
Indian Affairs was impliedly repealed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972 (“EEOA”), which forbid racial discrimination in federal hiring. The
plaintiffs alleged that Congress impliedly repealed the hiring preference by
enacting a law forbidding federal hiring discrimination. The U.S. Supreme Court
stated “there is nothing in the legislative history . . . that indicates affirmatively
any congressional intent to repeal the . . . preference. Indeed . . . there is ample

“implied repeal” of the FAA, to the extent of any genuine conflict.”) (citation omitted).
Id. (“[W]hen Congress so directs an agency action, with similar language, Congress has
amended the law.”) (citation omitted).
92

5 U.S.C. § 802(a) (“[T]he matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: “That
Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the __ relating to __, and such rule shall have no
force or effect.” (The blank spaces being appropriately filled in).”).
93

Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 463 U.S. 855, 868 (1983) (“[R]epeals by
implication are not favored. This doctrine flows from the basic principle that courts are not at
liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are
capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional
intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.”) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
94

95

Id., see also, Me. Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1323 (2020)
(“Presented with two statutes, the Court will regard each as effective—unless Congress’
intention to repeal is clear and manifest, or the two laws are ‘irreconcilable.’”) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
96

417 U.S. 535 (1974).
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independent evidence that the legislative intent was to the contrary.”97 Thus, the
Court held, there was no implied repeal of the Native American hiring preference.
Like the EEOA in Mancari, resolutions of disapproval do not contain
congressional intent to expressly repeal substantive laws driving agency rules, 98
and courts should hesitate to find a repeal of underlying statutes absent clear
congressional intent.
Second, “it is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific
governs the general.”99 Statutes directing agencies to promulgate rules are
invariably more detailed than boilerplate resolutions of disapproval. For example,
the rulemaking provisions contained in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”),100 the authority under which a 2016
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rule was promulgated, 101 are
detailed and specific. Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank amended the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 to add detailed provisions directing the SEC to promulgate
rules regarding resource extraction issuer payments. 102 In total, Section 1504 adds
six technical defined terms and numerous provisions addressing rulemaking
consultation, interactive data standards, and international transparency efforts to
Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act. 103 Conversely, the 2017 joint
resolution of disapproval says only that the 2016 SEC rule no longer had any

97

Id. at 550. See id. at 547–49 (addressing congressional intent to keep the IRA preference
fully intact, the Court discussed the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s positive treatment of the
preference, an additional two laws providing a Native American preference immediately after
enactment of the EEOA, and Native American hiring preferences treatment as exception to
anti-discriminatory Executive Orders (as the EEOA was essentially a codification of
previously issued Executive Orders)).
5 U.S.C. § 802(a) (“[T]he matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: “That
Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the __ relating to __, and such rule shall have no
force or effect.” (The blank spaces being appropriately filled in).”).
98

99

RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (quoting
Morales v. TWA, 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992)); see also CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45153,
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THEORIES, TOOLS, AND TRENDS 55 (2018).
100

Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641).

101

SEC, Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 81 Fed. Reg. 49,360 (July
27, 2016).
102

Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, at 2220, Title XV § 1504; Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. 78m(q).
103

Id.
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force or effect.104 In this case, the more specific Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank
should control over the more general 2017 joint resolution.
Next, while the statute enacted later in time generally controls, such a rule
should not apply when the latter statute is vague in its effect and application
would foster uncertainty. Rulemaking authorizations are normally far more
specific and detailed than the generic, scripted language present in CRA
resolutions. With limited and mandatory language contained in resolutions of
disapproval speaking only to an agency rule, a court should avoid an
interpretation that raises more questions than it resolves.
Finally, Congress exerts a substantial amount of effort and takes
considerable amounts of time to draft legislation as lengthy and nuanced as DoddFrank or FLPMA.105 FLPMA, for example, was enacted only after years of study
by a bi-partisan Public Land Law Review Commission whose recommendations
were fully debated and weighed, over several years, by Congress.106 Allowing a
later Congress to set aside that work, without careful deliberation or careful
explanation, is antithetical to sound lawmaking.
In summary, while the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Bernhardt provides
some authority to support statutory amendment through a joint resolution of
disapproval, both legal and policy arguments counsel for rejecting a broad
interpretation of “substantially the same” that would result in statutory
amendments by implication of the CRA.
V.

PLANNING 3.0 AND A “SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT” RULE

In this section, we propose several potential changes to Planning 2.0. We
use these proposals to explore the application and implications of the interpretive
arguments raised above. In the last section, we propose changes to the CRA
(including repeal) that would eliminate the problem currently facing the BLM and
other agencies.
The test of a new rule under the CRA is whether the rule is substantially
different from the prior rule—not whether the new rule differs in ways intended
by those who drafted the joint resolution of disapproval. We do, however, think
104

Pub. L. No. 115-4, 131 Stat. 9 (Feb. 14, 2017).

105

Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (Oct. 21, 1976) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§
1701-84).
106

See generally, Eleanor Schwartz, A Capsule Examination of the Legislative History of the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 285 (1979)
(recounting the years of effort leading up FLPMA’s enactment).
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that the BLM should remain mindful of congressional concerns when it issues a
new rule. That said, the intent of a Congress that is no longer in power and that
did not reduce its intentions to law, even if they can be ascertained accurately,
should not trump the policy objectives of the current Congress or presidential
administration. Elections, after all, have consequences.
There are ample opportunities to differentiate a new planning rule from
Planning 2.0, and we offer several examples of changes to discretionary
requirements. At the outset we note a concern that the BLM will act based on
policy preferences, and that these preferences may disadvantage longstanding
land users, appears to undergird many of the criticisms leveled at Planning 2.0. A
revised planning rule could commit the BLM to relying on the best available
science, as required by Executive Order 13563 and as noted in the preamble to the
final rule.107 This mandate, however, was not included in Planning 2.0 itself, and
incorporating such a requirement, including clarification of what constitutes the
best available science and how the BLM should act in the face of scientific
uncertainty, would both insulate a new rule from policy based changes and
differentiate the new rule from Planning 2.0.
Another simple change from Planning 2.0 would be to increase the time
available to review the planning assessment, scoping notice, draft plan or plan
amendment, and other planning documents. More time could also be provided for
the Governor’s consistency review. These changes would address concerns that
reduced timelines under Planning 2.0 increased burdens on state and local
governments, some of which struggle to provide meaningful input on complex
RMP amendments.108
Next, Planning 2.0 stated that the deciding official for plans implicating
national level policy determinations or crossing state lines shall be determined by
either the Secretary of the Interior or the Director of the BLM, and that the State
Director will determine the deciding official for plans that are wholly within one
state.109 The perceived shift in power away from local communities was a
criticism repeatedly leveled at Planning 2.0 in the House of Representatives.110 An
updated planning rule could define what constitutes a national level policy. An
107

81 Fed. Reg. 89580, 89658 (Dec. 12, 2016).

108

WGA Letter at 3.

109

See Planning 2.0, to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 1610.0-4.

Cong. Rec. H1032-41 (Feb. 7, 2017) (“Let me be clear: Planning 2.0 takes planning
decisions away from local communities and centralizes those decisions with bureaucrats in
Washington, D.C.” Statement by Rep. Gosar, id. at 1036. See also statements by Reps.
Cheney, McClintock, Tipton, Lamalfa, and Stewart.
110
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updated planning rule could also clarify when the Field Office Supervisor will
normally serve as the deciding official. When coupled with more time for state
and local governments to review planning materials to identify inconsistencies
with local plans, these changes would address concerns that decisionmaking
authority may shift away from those BLM officials who live and work closest to
the resource under the BLM’s care.
Concerns that Planning 2.0 failed to give ample consideration to state and
local planning documents were also a common refrain in the debate on the joint
resolution of disapproval. While FLPMA requires, 111 and Planning 2.0 retained,112
requirements to promote consistency across jurisdictions, the BLM could
strengthen those requirements. Planning 2.0 stated that the BLM was not required
to address plan consistency “if the responsible official has not been notified, in
writing, by Federal agencies, State and local governments, or Indian tribes of an
apparent inconsistency.”113 A revised rule could clarify that the BLM will request
officially approved and adopted state and local plans that are relevant to the
planning process. A revised rule could further clarify that the BLM cannot avoid
addressing consistency with applicable plans that are within its possession simply
because written copies of those plans were not provided by state or local
government officials.114
As noted earlier, the legal question is whether the next generation of the
BLM’s planning rule is substantially different from Planning 2.0, not whether it
differs in ways the authors of the joint resolution of disapproval may have
preferred but never reduced to law. Changes that advance resource protection
could therefore differentiate the BLM’s next planning rule. For example, Planning
2.0 includes only one mention of climate change, and that mention is as part of a
list of factors that need to be considered in developing the planning assessment. 115
The BLM is legally obligated to consider climate change when making planning
decisions, and to manage for a changing climate. 116 Numerous recent court cases
111

43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9).

112

See Planning 2.0, to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3-3.

113

See Planning 2.0, to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 1610.3-3(a)(2).

114

Ultimate responsibility for providing applicable planning documents should, however, rest
with the agencies that authored those plans as those agencies are best able to identify and
provide the documents.
115

See Planning 2.0, to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 1610.4(d)(6).

See Jamie Gibbs Pleune, John C. Ruple & Nada Wolff Culver, The BLM’s Duty to
Incorporate Climate Science into Permitting Practices and a Proposal for Implementing a
Net Zero Requirement into Oil and Gas Permitting, 32 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY & ENVTL.
116
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hold that the BLM errs when it fails to adequately consider climate change. 117 The
BLM could differentiate a revised planning rule from Planning 2.0, and improve
both planning and plan implementation, by providing clear direction about how to
address climate change.
Planning 2.0 also included only scant mention of mitigation, noting that
RMPs should contain objectives that “[i]dentify standards to mitigate undesirable
impacts to resource conditions.”118 An updated planning rule could include more
direction about when the BLM can and should implement such standards, the
authority for and enforceability of requiring mitigation, how to determine the
sufficiency of required mitigation, whether mitigation requirements contained in
planning documents can be waived, and waiver procedures if waivers are indeed
allowed.
Staying with mitigation, a new planning rule could also require earlier
consideration of mitigation opportunities. The BLM routinely defers decisions
regarding mitigation, at least within the oil and gas development context, until the
Application for a Permit to Drill (“APD”) phase. 119 The BLM justifies this
decision by saying that the availability of more granular information at the APD
phase makes it easier to address site-specific concerns, but by then, the

L. REV. 253 (2021) (see section III and cases cited therein).
117

See e.g., California v. Bernhardt, Case No. 4:18-cv-05712-YGR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
128961 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2020) (BLM erred by disregarding climate change in the methane
waste prevention rule); Citizens for Clean Energy v. United States Dept. of Int., 384 F. Supp.
1264 (D. Mont. Apr. 19, 2019) (BLM erred by ignoring climate change impacts in coal
leasing requirements); Citizens for a Healthy Community v. U.S. BLM, 377 F. Supp. 3d 1223,
1236-37 (D. Colo. 2019) (BLM erred by failing to take a hard look at indirect effects resulting
from development of oil and gas developed from federal lands); San Juan Citizens All. v. U.S.
BLM, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1242 (D.N.M. 2018) (BLM erred in failing to adequately
analyze indirect impact of greenhouse gas emissions in approving oil and gas leases);
WildEarth Guardians v. United States, CV-18-73-GF-BMM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77409
(D. Mont. May 1, 2020) (BLM erred by failing to consider cumulative effect of multiple oil
and gas leasing decisions); WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 71 (D.D.C.
2019) (same).
118

See Planning 2.0, 43 C.F.R. §1610.1-2(a)(2(i).

119

APD issuance is the final phase of development and occurs after the BLM has first
determined, through planning, that an area is appropriate for oil and gas leasing and also
determined what land use stipulations are appropriate for that landscape. The BLM then, after
reviewing expressions of leasing interest, can offer areas for lease. Only after a lease is issued
can the BLM consider an APD.
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commitment to allow development has already occurred.120
A new planning rule could require that, to the maximum extent
practicable, the BLM identify programmatic mitigation measures during the
planning phase to ensure: (1) uniform application of mitigation requirements
across all actors, and (2) to reduce the chance that mitigation opportunities will be
missed, thereby minimizing the risk of “unnecessary or undue degradation of the
lands.”121 Moving in this direction is consistent with FLMPA as well as NEPA’s
mandate to fully consider impacts before making an irretrievable commitment of
resources.122
Finally, FLPMA requires the BLM to “give priority to the designation and
protection of areas of critical environmental concern,” or ACECs.123 Planning 2.0
included only meager direction on ACEC designation or management. A revised
planning rule could distinguish itself by including robust direction about how
“priority” should be given to ACEC designation and protection. Other changes are
also possible and could be identified through rulemaking.
VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE CRA

The other method for resolving the BLM’s rulemaking quandary is to
target the tool creating the difficulty: the CRA. Most of the issues involving the
CRA stem from the ambiguity of the phrase “substantially the same,” as well as
the troubling lack of guidance provided by Congress to agencies subject to joint
resolutions of disapproval. We propose four methods to address these issues: (1)
A repeal of the CRA; (2) Statutorily defining “substantially the same”; (3)
Amending the CRA to require congressional direction to agencies; and (4)
Interpreting resolutions of disapproval and “substantially the same” narrowly.
Options 2, 3, and 4 may be most effective if undertaken together.
120

See, e.g., San Juan Citizens All. v. U.S. BLM, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1244 (D.N.M. 2018)
(where the BLM argued that “it would work with industry at a later date [after leasing] to
facilitate the use of the relevant best management practices”.). See also, Duna Vista Resorts,
187 Interior Dec. 43 (IBLA 2016) (arguing that it was appropriate to issue a FONSI at the
leasing stage because the BLM had authority to mitigate all potential environmental effects
by imposing COAs at the APD stage).
121

43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).

See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2(a) (“Agencies should integrate the NEPA process with other
planning and authorization processes at the earliest reasonable time to ensure that agencies
consider environmental impacts in their planning and decisions.”).
122

123

43 U.S.C. § 1712((b)(3).
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A.

Repeal the Congressional Review Act

The most effective way to mitigate the issues the CRA raises is to repeal
the Act. Most of the existing literature124 and prior congressional attempts at
amending the CRA 125 adopt this approach.126 The main argument for repeal is that
Congress can already eliminate an agency rule by enacting a statute repealing the
rule.127 Through non-CRA legislation, Congress would have time for robust
hearings and longer floor debate in both houses, creating a more transparent,
detailed, and enlightening record to guide subsequent agency action.
Confining Congress to its Article I legislative authority would increase the
time and effort required to rescind flawed agency rules, and this can be both good
and bad. Realistically, there is little impetus for Congress to reduce its own power
by repealing the Act, as the fast-track parliamentary procedures can be an
attractive tool irrespective of political persuasion. 128 While some members of
124

See Thomas O. McGarity, Reina Steinzor, James Goodwin & Katherine Tracy, The
Congressional Review Act: The Case for Repeal, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2018),
https://cpr-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/CRA_Repeal_Case_050218.pdf; Lisa
Gilbert & Amit Narang, Scrap the Congressional Review Act, REGULATORY REVIEW (June 7,
2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/06/07/gilbert-narang-scrap-congressional-reviewact/.
125

See SCRAP Act, S. 1140, 115th Cong. §§ 2(a), 3(b) (2017) (calling for the full repeal of
the CRA, and providing federal agencies authority to “reinstate a [CRA disapproved] rule by
publishing the [disapproved] rule in the Federal Register during the 1-year period beginning
on the date of enactment of this Act.”).
126

Short of a full repeal of the CRA, Congress could amend the CRA to remove the
resolution of disapproval and “substantially the same” provisions from the Act while leaving
the review provisions fully intact. So, while Congress could not use the CRA to rescind a
regulation, the amended CRA would help Congress remain apprised of developments in the
administrative state. This in turn could lead to a traditional congressional repeal of unpopular
regulations. With normal legislative procedures controlling, Congress could more easily
direct agencies that are required to promulgate a rule how to do so. Without the weight of the
“substantially the same” provision resting on an agency’s shoulders, it is more likely to
promulgate a new rule that still addresses administrative and policy issues in an adequate
manner.
TODD GARVEY & DANIEL J. SHEFFNER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45442, CONGRESS’S
AUTHORITY TO INFLUENCE AND CONTROL EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES 8–9 (2018).
127

128

Sam Batkins, Issues at the Intersection of the Three Branches: Congress Strikes Back: The
Institutionalization of the Congressional Review Act, 45 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 351,
383 (2019) (“Progressive groups may not love the use of the CRA at all times, but in this
instance—when it is designed to produce a favorable policy outcome—resolutions of
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Congress may be appalled by use of the CRA against rules they find necessary
and beneficial, those same members may find the CRA more palatable when
confronted with rules they, and their constituents, vehemently oppose. Doing
away with the CRA would also address the perverse incentive noted above,
whereby an administration may choose to differentiate a rule from its disapproved
predecessor by moving in the opposite direction from which Congress intended.
We believe the overall increase in procedural transparency, thoughtful
deliberation, and clear agency guidance will lead to better regulatory outcomes.
We also believe that laws should be structured to make rules more, not less,
consistent with congressional intent. In light of these considerations, we believe
that the benefits of repealing the CRA outweigh reductions in congressional
expediency.
B.

Define “Substantially the Same”

Congress should, at a minimum, amend the CRA to define “substantially
the same.” A statutory definition would allow agencies to move more freely
through subsequent rulemaking, knowing where the CRA’s boundaries lie.
Simply having a definitional benchmark against which to measure the adequacy
of subsequent action would greatly aid both agencies and reviewing courts. While
this article does not put forth any specific statutory definition, existing literature
provides guidance in drafting a statutory definition of “substantially the same.”129
We believe that the definition should be as narrow as possible to avoid impairing
an agency’s ability to fulfill its underlying statutory mandate.

disapproval can come in handy. This is one glaring example of why, despite the number of
progressives or conservatives in Congress, they will likely never vote to repeal the entire
CRA.”). But notably, as of the writing of this article, seventeen resolutions of disapproval
have been enacted by Republican administrations compared to three by Democratic
administrations.
129

See Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 73 (providing seven possible interpretive methodologies
regarding “substantially the same”); Coglianese, supra note 82 at 20-15 (providing an
interpretation of “substantially the same” based upon the rulemaking discretion available to
an agency under governing statutes); MAEVE P. CAREY & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R46690, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT ISSUES FOR THE 117TH CONGRESS: THE
LOOKBACK MECHANISM AND EFFECTS OF DISAPPROVAL 9–11 (Feb. 19, 2021), (“In light of
[the CRA’s] legislative history, agencies considering reissuing rules may look to the reasons
Congress gave, if any, for striking down the rule in the first place.”).
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C.

Require Congressional Direction to Administrative Agencies

A recurring critique of the CRA is that Congress provides virtually no
guidance regarding a rule’s perceived ills or what changes to a disapproved rule
would cure those defects when passing resolutions of disapproval. Congress only
says “no,” and tells the agency that the new rule must differ from the old. While
the CRA does not explicitly bar Congress from providing more direction, the
CRA does require that all resolutions of disapproval contain the same generic
language.130 Identifying the problems with a rule, and directing an agency towards
specific revisions, would ensure that changes contained in a replacement rule
result in the kind of substantive changes intended by Congress.131
Ironically, the test of a replacement rule is not whether it responds to
congressional concerns, which the agency and a reviewing court can only guess
at, but whether the replacement rule is substantially different from the original
rule. As the Stream Protection Rule example shows, an agency can differentiate a
rule from its disapproved predecessor in ways that either frustrate or further
congressional intent, and both approaches appear equally defensible. Requiring
Congress to include clear direction to agencies ensure that replacement rules
advance congressional intent and reduce the potential for administrative mischief,
which was what the CRA was supposed to do all along.
D.

Interpret the Congressional Review Act Narrowly

Finally, agencies should interpret “substantially the same” narrowly to
retain sufficient regulatory flexibility to address the pressing issues that Congress
charged to agency care when it passed laws authorizing rulemaking. In hearing
CRA cases, courts should also interpret “substantially the same” narrowly to
provide agencies ample room to promulgate rules consistent with their statutory
mandates. The answer is not to hobble agencies with ambiguous limits, but to
encourage Congress to legislate with clarity and specificity.
In most legislation delegating broad rulemaking authority to
administrative agencies, Congress spends significant time and energy creating
complex statutory schemes that agencies must implement. If, in reviewing an
agency rule subject to § 801(b)(2) of the CRA, courts gave a broad construction to
the term “substantially the same,” thereby preventing whole swaths of regulation,
130

5 U.S.C. § 802(a).

131

For a similar CRA suggestion, see Eric Dude, Note, The Conflicting Mandate: Agency
Paralysis Through the Congressional Review Act’s Resubmit Provision, 30 COLO. NAT. RES.
ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 137–40 (2019).
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the CRA “cure” could become more worse than the ill. If Congress indeed intends
to make wide-ranging changes to a substantive statute, concludes that an agency
has strayed from its mandate, or decides that a statutory mandate no longer
reflects the objectives of the congressional majority, Congress should clarify that
mandate.
The level of deference granted to an agency in interpreting its substantive
mandate under statutes other than the CRA, and in promulgating rules following a
joint resolution of disapproval, should be inversely proportional to the level of
direction provided by Congress when it enacts the resolution. If Congress
provides clear direction, discretion should be interpreted narrowly as agencies
must abide by that direction. If Congress just says “no,” Congress is effectively
granting broad discretion to agencies, and reviewing courts should be more
deferential when reviewing replacement regulations. This approach would have
the added benefit of incentivizing legislative clarity.
VII.

CONCLUSION

If an administrative rule displeases Congress, Congress should forego the
CRA and repeal that rule using traditional legislative tools, ensuring a full and
open debate over the substance of the rule and providing the agency with clear
direction regarding both the problems perceived and the changes needed. If
allowed to persist, the CRA should be amended to define “substantially the
same,” and to require Congress to direct future agency action responding to
disapprovals.
The CRA should not, however, prevent federal agencies from undertaking
tasks within their charge. Statutes directing agencies to act must continue to be
given effect, and the CRA should be interpreted to avoid implicitly dismantling
complex regulatory programs. This can be accomplished by interpreting
“substantially the same” as applying only to those portions of a rule that are
charged to agency discretion.
As illustrated by the BLM’s planning rule example, changes making a
replacement rule substantially different from a rule struck down under the CRA
need not move the replacement rule in the direction preferred by the Congress that
dismantled the prior rule. Ironically, the CRA may embolden the BLM to issue a
revised planning rule that is far greener than the rule disapproved of by
congressional Republicans. While that may reflect good environmental policy, a
law that incentivizes agencies to act contrary to the will of Congress has no place
in our legal system. It is time to repeal the CRA.
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